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* * * * * * * * * 
PETERSON PLUMBING SUPPLY, ) 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-vs-
JEFFERY H. BERNSON, STEVEN B. 
TERRY and ROBERT F. BABCOCK, 
General Partners of VESCOR 
FINANCIAL SERVICES, also doing 
business as REGENCY APARTMENTS, 
and GENE BOWERS, dba BOWERS 
CONSTRUCTION, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal to the Utah Supreme Court of the 
Final Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court, Honorable 
J* Dennis Frederick, following a non-jury trial on July 20, 
1988. Pursuant to Rule 4A of the Utah Rules of the Supreme 
Court this appeal was transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals 
on the 3 0th day of November, 1988. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the final decision of the 
Third Judicial District Court dismissing Plaintiff-Appellant's 
Complaint against Defendants-Respondents Jeffery H. Bernson, 
Steven B. Terry and Robert F. Babcock, General Partners of 
Vescor Financial Services, dba Regency Apartments. 
CASE NO. 880667-CA 
Category No. 14b 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Section 7-15-1, Utah Code Annotated requires that 
a bad check be given for "property" or some "other thing of 
value". 
(a) Does the Utah Uniform Commercial Code apply 
which provides that an instrument is given for value even 
though it is given in payment of an antecedent debt? 
(b) Was the check in question given for a 
"thing of value" where it was given to purchase credit in favor 
of the issuer on a purchase contract and such credit would have 
been in an amount greater than the amount of the check? 
(c) Was the check given for some "thing of 
value" where it was given to release a potential lien? 
2. Should the civil bad check statute be interpreted 
the same as the criminal bad check section and, if so, does the 
civil statute retain any useful purpose? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Section 70A-3-303, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended: 
Taking for value. A holder takes the instrument for 
value 
(a) to the extent that the agreed consideration has 
been performed or that he acquires a security 
interest in or a lien on the instrument 
otherwise than by legal process; or 
(b) when he takes the instrument in payment of or as 
security for an antecedent claim against any 
person whether or not the claim is due; or 
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(c) when he gives a negotiable instrument for it or 
makes an irrevocable commitment to a third 
person. 
Section 70A-3-408, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended: 
Consideration. Want or failure of consideration is a 
defense as against any person not having the rights 
of a holder in due course (section 70A-3-305), except 
that no consideration is necessary for an instrument 
or obligation thereon given in payment of or as 
security for an antecedent obligation of any kind. 
Nothing in this section shall be taken to displace 
any statute outside this act under which a promise is 
enforceable notwithstanding lack or failure of 
consideration. Partial failure of consideration is a 
defense pro tanto whether or not the failure is in an 
ascertained or liquidated amount. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
At a non-jury trial held on July 20, 1988, and 
following the presentation of Plaintiff-Appellant's case in 
chief, the Trial Court entered a directed verdict dismissing 
Plaintiff-Appellant's Complaint as to Defendants-Respondents 
Jeffery H. Bernson, Steven B. Terry and Robert F. Babcock. The 
Trial Court dismissed both a cause of action based on a theory 
of third party beneficiary and also a cause of action based on 
§7-15-1, (civil remedy for the collection of bad checks). This 
is an appeal from the judgment of the Trial Court as to the bad 
check (§7-15-1) cause of action only. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Between June, 1983 and August, 1984, Plaintiff-
Appellant, Peterson Plumbing Supply, (hereinafter "Peterson 
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Plumbing") delivered materials to an apartment project then 
owned by Defendant Bowers (hereinafter "Bowers"). 
2. In August or September of 1984, Peterson Plumbing 
was notified of the fact that the apartment project was to be 
sold. Peterson Plumbing was directed to contact Defendant-
Respondent Babcock (hereinafter "Babcock") as the 
representative of the proposed buyer, (Tr. p. 12) 
3. Conversations were conducted between Peterson 
Plumbing and Babcock prior to the acquisition of the project by 
Regency Apartments, a partnership consisting of Defendants-
Respondents Bernson, Terry and Babcock (herein collectively 
referred to as "Regency")• (Tr. pp. 12-15) 
4. Regency was aware of the amounts due Peterson 
Plumbing prior to the acquisition of the project by Regency. 
(Tr. pp. 12, 63) 
5. The sale of the Apartment Project by Bowers to 
Regency was completed on December 31, 1984. (Tr. p. 84) 
6. On May 15, 1985, Peterson Plumbing received a 
check from Regency in the amount of $13,750.00. (Tr. p. 16) 
7. Regency was attempting to pay off Bowers1 
outstanding creditors at a discount with an agreement that 
Regency would receive credit against the purchase price payable 
to Bowers equal to the full amount due a particular creditor. 
Regency would have received a credit on their contract with 
Bowers in an amount in excess of $19,000.00 upon the payment of 
$13,750.00 to Peterson Plumbing. (Tr. pp. 75, 97-98, 100) 
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8. After acquiring the Apartment Project, Regency 
immediately sold the project to Wiltshire Utah I Limited 
Partnership. (Tr. p. 84) 
9. At trial the Court granted a directed verdict in 
favor of Defendants-Respondents Bernson, Terry and Babcock 
(Regency Apartments) dismissing both a cause of action based on 
a third party beneficiary theory and also a cause of action 
under §7-15-1 for the civil collection of a bad check. (Tr. p. 
130) 
10. The dismissal of the cause of action under §7-
15-1 was based upon a Finding that the check was not given for 
a "thing of value". (Tr. p. 129) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Trial Court held that the check was not given for 
a "thing of value" because the check represented payment for 
plumbing supplies and materials previously delivered and 
incorporated into the apartment complex, or in other words, the 
Trial Court held that the check represented payment for an 
antecedent debt. 
By so holding, the Trial Court appears to have 
adopted the theories or interpretations imposed upon criminal 
prosecution for the issuance of a bad check. 
The Trial Court erred in applying the same test or 
theory in a civil action as that imposed in the criminal 
context. 
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The Utah Uniform Commercial Code, §§70A-3-303 and 
7 0A-3-4 08 expressly provide that a negotiable instrument is 
given for value when given for payment of an antecedent 
obligation. 
The check was given not only to partially satisfy an 
antecedent debt, but also, to purchase credit on a purchase 
contract; the credit being more than the amount of the check. 
The Supreme Court of Colorado has held that a 
mechanic's lien is a "thing of value" in a bad check criminal 
case. 
If the same interpretation or burden of proof is 
imposed in a civil action for collection of a bad check as that 
required in the criminal context, the civil remedy is rendered 
superfluous and meaningless. The rules of statutory 
construction and interpretation require that civil §7-15-1 be 
interpreted so as to render it meaningful. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UNDER THE UTAH UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, A 
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT GIVEN IN PAYMENT OF 
AN ANTECEDENT DEBT IS GIVEN "FOR VALUE". 
The Utah Uniform Commercial Code, on negotiable 
instruments, defines a holder in due course as a person who has 
taken an instrument "for value". It provides that an 
instrument is taken "for value" and no new consideration is 
necessary when it is taken in payment of an antecedent debt. 
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Section 70A-3-303 in pertinent part provides that "A 
holder takes the instrument for value *** (b) when he takes the 
instrument in payment of or as security for an antecedent claim 
against any person whether or not the claim is due ***". 
Parallel with §70A-3-303, §70A-3-408 provides: "*** 
that no consideration is necessary for an instrument or 
obligation thereon given in payment of or as security for an 
antecedent obligation of any kind. ***" 
Section 7-15-1 as a civil remedy for the collection 
of a check should be construed consistent with and in light of 
these sections of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code and 
distinguished from interpretations placed on the criminal 
actions on bad checks. 
POINT II 
THE CHECK WAS GIVEN NOT ONLY TO COVER AN 
ANTECEDENT DEBT, BUT ALSO TO PURCHASE 
CREDIT. 
Defendant-Respondent Jeffery H. Bernson testified 
upon cross-examination that while the potential claim of 
Peterson Plumbing was a consideration, the primary motivation 
for the issuance of the $13,750.00 check to Peterson Plumbing 
was to make money. (Tr. p. 106 line 23) 
Agreements existed between Regency and Bowers to the 
effect that regardless of the amount paid to satisfy a given 
sub-contractor, Regency would receive credit on their purchase 
contract with Bowers equal to the total amount of the sub-
contractor's claim. 
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The $13,750.00 check to Peterson Plumbing represented 
credit to Regency in an amount in excess of $19,000.00. 
The "thing of value" was the credit obtained by 
Regency at a discount as they paid off each sub-contractor. 
POINT III 
A LIEN CONSTITUTES A "THING OF VALUE". 
In the case of Beasley vs. People, 450 P. 2d 658 
(Colo. 1969) the Colorado Supreme Court was called upon to 
interpret its criminal code covering the issuance of bad checks 
which required that the check be given to procure a "thing of 
value". 
The check in question had been given to obtain a 
waiver of a mechanic's lien. The court rejected the argument 
that a mechanic's lien was merely a right in realty and 
expressly found that it represented a "thing of value" even in 
the context of a criminal action. 
This Court should, likewise, recognize that a 
mechanic's or materialmen's lien upon real property as 
statutorily created is a "thing of value" especially for 
purposes of the civil enforcement of a negotiable instrument. 
In addition to the premise that a statutory lien 
constitutes a "thing of value" the Utah Supreme Court has found 
consideration in one's forbearance in bringing legal action to 
collect an old debt. 
In A.M. Castle and Company vs. Bagley, 4 67 P. 2d 408 
(Utah 1970), the court found that there was adequate 
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consideration for a note where the payee refrained from 
bringing an action against the maker of a note in reliance upon 
the maker's promise to pay an old account. 
In the case at hand, the Trial Court expressly found 
that the President of Peterson Plumbing "was persuaded to avoid 
the filing of his materials' lien against the property by 
individuals who were more concerned about their own welfare 
than his". (Tr. p. 155) 
Based on promises from the parties involved to pay 
the amounts due Peterson Plumbing it refrained from perfecting 
its materialmen's lien upon the property which represents still 
another form of consideration to support the check involved. 
POINT IV 
SECTION 7-15-1 IS RENDERED MEANINGLESS IF 
GIVEN THE SAME INTERPRETATION AS THAT 
IMPOSED IN A CRIMINAL CASE. 
Section 7-15-1 serves no practical purpose if the 
burden of proof or test imposed is the same as that imposed 
under criminal §76-6-505. The Legislature is presumed to have 
intended some useful and practical purpose when enacting 
§7-15-1. 
The Supreme C o u r t i n Millett vs. Clark Clinic Corporation, 609 
P.2d 934 (Utah 1980), held that: 
It is to be observed, more over, that 
statutory enactments are to be so construed 
as to render all parts thereof relevant and 
meaningful and that interpretations are to 
be avoided which render some part of a 
provision nonsensical or absurd ***. 
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While a very strict and narrow interpretation may be 
appropriate and even constitutionally mandated in the context 
of criminal prosecution, the same should not apply when 
interpreting a civil statute providing a civil remedy only. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court erred in interpreting §7-15-1 the 
same as its criminal code counterpart. It should be construed 
and interpreted in light of other civil sections governing the 
rights and remedies of a holder of a negotiable instrument. In 
the alternative, this Court should find that the check was 
given for a "thing of value" where it was given for the purpose 
of buying credit especially where the obtainable credit was in 
an amount greater than the check. Likewise, this Court should 
find that a check given to obtain a release of a materialmen's 
lien is given for a "thing of value". 
The Judgment of the Trial Court with respect to the 
check should be reversed and Peterson Plumbing should be 
entitled to a judgment in the amount of the check together with 
interest and attorneys1 fees as provided in §7-15-1. 
Respectfully submitted, 
OLSEN, McIF|?& CHAMBERLAIN 
Etcharti K. Chamberlain 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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7-16-1. Civil liability of issuer - Notice. 
7-15-2. Notice furm. 
7-15-1. Civil liability of issuer — Notice. (1) Any person who makes, draws, 
signs or issues any check, draft, order, or other instrument upon any depository 
institution, whether as corporate agent or otherwise, for the purpose of obtaining 
from any person, firm, partnership or corporation any money, merchandise, prop* 
erty or other thing of value or paying for any service, wages, salary or rent, which 
check, draft, order, or other instrument is not honored upon presentment and is 
marked "refer to maker" or the account with the depository upon which the check, 
draft, order, or other instrument has been made or drawn, does not exist, has been 
closed or does not have sufficient funds or sufficient credit with such depository 
for payment of the check, draft, or ather instrument in full, shall be liable to the 
holder thereof. 
(2) The holder of the check, draft, order, or other instrument which has been 
dishonored may give written or verbal notice thereof to the person making, draw-
ing, signing, or issuing the check, draft, order, or other instrument and may impose 
a service charge not to exceed $5 in addition to any contractual agreement between 
the parties. Prior to filing an action based upon this section, the holder of a dishon-
ored check, draft, order, or other instrument shall give the person making, drawing, 
signing, or issuing the dishonored check, draft, order, or other instrument written 
notice of intent to file civil action, allowing the person seven days from the date 
on which the notice was mailed to tender payment in full, plus a service charge 
is imposed for the dishonored check, draft, order, or other instrument. 
(3) In a civil action the person making, drawing, signing or issuing the check, 
draft, order, or other instrument shall be liable to the holder of it for the amount 
thereon, for interest and all costs of collection, including all court costs and reason-
able attorney's fees. 
7-15-2. Notice form. (1) "Notice" means notice given to the person making, 
drawing, or issuing the check, draft, order, or other instrument either in person 
or in writing. Such notice, in writing, shall be conclusively presumed to have been 
given when properly deposited in the United States mails, postage prepaid, by certi-
fied or registered mail, return receipt requested, and addressed to such signer at 
his address as it appears on the check, draft, order, or other instrument or at his 
last-known address. 
(2) Written notice as applied in subsection 7-15-1 (2) shall take the following 
form: 
Date: 
To: You are hereby notified that check(s) described below issued by 





Reason for dishonor (marked on instrument): _ _ ^ _ _ ^ 
The foregoing instrument together with a service charge of $5 must be paid to 
the undersigned within seven days from the date of this notice in accordance with 
section 7-15-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, or appropriate civil legal action may be 
filed against you for the amount due and owing together with service charges, 
interest, court costs, and attorney's fees as provided by law. 
In addition, the criminal code provides in section 76-6-505, Utah Code Annotated 
1953: Any person who issues or passes a check for the payment of money, for the 
purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or corporation, any money, 
property, or other thing of value or paying for any services, wages, salary, labor, 
or rent, knowing it will not be paid by the drawee and payment is refused by the 
drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check. The foregoing civil action does not preclude 
the right to prosecute under the criminal code of the State of Utah. 
(Signed) 
Name of Holder 
Address of Holder: 
Telephone Number: 
76-6-505. Issuing a bad check or draft — Presumption. 
(1) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the payment of 
money, for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or 
corporation, any money, property, or other thing of value or paying for any 
services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, knowing it will not be paid by the 
drawee and payment is refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check 
or draft. 
For purposes of this subsection, a person who issues a check or draft for 
which payment is refused by the drawee is presumed to know the check or 
draft would not be paid if he had no account with the drawee at the time of 
issue. 
(2) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the payment of 
money, for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or 
corporation, any money, property, or other thing of value or paying for any 
services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, payment of which check or draft is 
legally refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check or draft if he 
fails to make good and actual payment to the payee in the amount of the 
refused check or draft within 14 days of his receiving actual notice of the 
check or draft's nonpayment. 
(3) An offense of issuing a bad check or draft shall be punished as follows: 
(a) If the check or draft or series of checks or drafts made or drawn in 
this state within a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum of 
not more than $200, such offense shall be a class B misdemeanor. 
(b) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state 
within a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum exceeding 
$200 but not more than $300, such offense shall be a class A misde-
meanor. 
(c) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state 
within a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum exceeding 
$300 but not more than $1,000, such offense shall be a felony of the third 
degree. 
(d) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state 
within a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum exceeding 
$1,000, such offense shall be a second degree felony. 
